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Beneting from Failures to Address Climate Change
[This is the penultimate draft of a forthcoming paper, to appear in the Journal of Applied Philosophy,  
Special Issue on Beneting from Wrongdoing, Eds. Avia Pasternak & Edward Page].
Abstract
The politics of climate change is marked by the fact that countries are dragging their 
heels in doing what they ought to do, namely, creating a binding global treaty, and 
fulflling the duties  assigned to each of  them under it.  Many different agents  are 
culpable in this failure. But we can imagine a stylized version of the climate change 
case,  in  which  no  agents  are  culpable:  if  the  bad effects  of  climate  change  were 
triggered  only  by  crossing  a  particular  threshold,  and  it  was  reasonably,  but 
mistakenly, believed by each country that insuffciently many other countries were 
willing  to  cooperate  in  order  for  that  threshold  to  remain  uncrossed,  no  country 
would be required to make a unilateral contribution. Yet even without culpability, we 
can diagnose a moral ill: the world has gone other than it should have. If not for the 
mistaken beliefs, there would have been a global climate treaty, and all the avoidance 
of future suffering that would come with it. In this paper I want to try to argue that  
this moral ill has implications for the non-culpable agents, in that it generates duties  
to disgorge actual holdings over and above the counterpart holdings in the relevant 
counterfactual: those holdings the agents would have had, were the world to have 
gone as it should.
Keywords:  benefting  from  injustice,  counterfactual  baselines,  non-identity  principle, 
climate change, collective action, disjunctive obligations, obligations to try
§I. Introduction
One  of  the  biggest  diffculties  in  addressing  the  most  serious  global 
problems today,  including the  suffering of  those in  severe poverty,  those 
seeking refuge and political asylum, those exposed to high risk of disease 
and ill health, and those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, is 
the sense of  entitlement that residents of affuent, developed countries feel 
toward their  holdings, holding which could otherwise be put to work in 
preventing or alleviating these kinds of suffering. In the literature on global 
justice, arguments for obligations to those in need have tended to come in 
two main forms: arguments from justice which attempt to show that certain 
holdings are in fact not rightfully the holder's; and arguments from charity 
which point to the capacities of the salient agents to answer to existing need. 
There are also two further forms of argument, the frst from association  and 
the second from benet.1 Association obviously does not involve culpability, 
but rather salient individuals standing in a certain relation to the victim or 
1 See  discussion in  Christian  Barry  & Holly  Lawford-Smith,  'Introduction',  in  Christian 
Barry & Holly Lawford-Smith (eds.) Global Justice (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), pp. xi-xxii.
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perpetrator of the harm2. It is less obvious how to characterize benefting. 
Prima  facie,  it  seems  that  an  agent  can't  be  culpable  in  having  beneted, 
because it will usually not be the case that she could have helped but beneft. 
So if culpability comes in at all, it will be at the stage of retaining benefts, for 
example once it becomes clear to the benefciary that she is in possession of  
them.
In this paper I want to adopt the spirit of justice-driven arguments, in 
attempting  to  undermine  that  sense  of  entitlement  the  affuent  (and 
otherwise able) have over their holdings, without accepting the fundamental 
assumption of justice-based arguments, namely that the best way to do that 
is to pin culpability upon them. I shall do that by frst attempting to  show 
that  the  world  can  go  other  than  it  ought  without  culpability,  and  then 
elaborating a principle  upon which it is impermissible to retain the material 
benefts the world going other than it  ought.  In a stylized version of  the 
climate change case, countries beneft materially from the failure to create a 
binding global treaty, in that they retain holdings that – had the world gone 
as it ought to have – would have been invested in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions reduction projects. Because it is impermissible to so beneft, they 
must relinquish those holdings.
A quick caveat before that: this is primarily a paper about beneting, 
intending to make a contribution to political philosophers'  discussions of 
obligations that might plausibly arise out of beneft. The paper is framed in 
terms  of  a  specifc  global  problem,  namely  the  negotiation  of  a  binding 
global  treaty  specifying  countries'  obligations  to  act  against  further 
anthropogenic climate change. But it's  not  a paper about climate change (I 
assume here in the  stylized case  that  climate  change is  only  a  threshold 
problem, and I'm arguing elsewhere that it isn't),3 and it's also not a paper 
that tries to defend the 'benefciary-pays' principle4 for allocating the burdens 
of global GHG emissions against other principles, such as the  'ability to pay' 
2 In liberal theory obligations from association are almost always a matter of relation to the  
victim of the harm, but there are communitarian societies, e.g. rural Papua New Guinea, 
and 'honour culture' societies, e.g. parts of the American South, where it is often a matter of  
relation to the perpetrator of the harm (for example, it can be thought appropriate to seek  
retribution for a harm upon family members or members of the same small community as  
the  perpetrator).  It's  possible  to  argue  that  the  latter  do  involve  culpability,  just  on  a 
communitarian rather than an individualist model, but it will remain true that the former 
do not.
3 Holly Lawford-Smith, 'Individuals' and Collectives' Climate Obligations', ms.
4 Lukas Meyer & Dominic Roser, 'Climate Justice and Historical Emissions', Critical Review 
of Social and Political Philosophy, 13 (2010): 229-253; Axel Gosseries, 'Historical Emissions and 
Free-Riding', Ethical Perspectives, 11 (2004): 36-60; Ed Page, 'Give it up for climate change: a 
defence of the benefciary pays principle', International Theory 4 (2012): 300-330. 
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principle5 or  the  'polluter  pays'  principle.6 It  rather  refnes  the  general 
benefting  principle  such  that  it  might  be  better  suited  to  such  uses 
elsewhere.
§II. Moral ills without culpable agents
Although as just mentioned there is disagreement about the exact principle 
or  combination  of  principles  we  should  use  to  allocate  GHG  emissions 
reductions between countries, it is implausible to think that it is the lack of a 
perfect  principle  which  is  preventing  countries  from  creating  a  binding 
global treaty specifying a plan of action for addressing climate change, and it 
is  likewise  implausible  to  think  that  what's  stopping  the  individuals 
inhabiting those countries from making unilateral reductions to their own 
personal GHG emissions. There's culpable failure to act nearly everywhere 
we look: individual citizens' selective attention with respect to the scientifc 
facts about climate change; citizens' failure to put pressure on their elected 
representatives  to  introduce  new  (or  better)  emissions-reduction  policy; 
elected  representatives'  prioritizing  of  re-election  over  environmental 
protection;  governments'  failure  to  lead  social  change  by  attempting  to 
introduce new policy without mandate; particular governments' blocking of 
agreements  at  international  meetings;  particular  developed  countries' 
citizens'  prioritizing  of  their  continued  hold  on  luxury  goods  over  the 
(projected) basic needs of developing countries' citizens; current generations' 
prioritizing  of  their  material  comforts  (private  vehicles,  cheap  meat  and 
produce, affordable fights, etc.) at the expense of future generations' basic 
welfare;  the list  goes on.  All  that culpability makes it  rather easy for the 
climate ethicist to assign remedial or reparatory obligations, in addition to 
obligations arising from the fact of (projected) suffering. This paper sets all  
of that culpability aside, in the interest of exploring a particular kind of case: 
one in which we might intuitively think the world has gone other than it  
ought,  without  any  agent doing  other  than  she  ought,  which  is  to  say, 
without culpability.
The case I'm about to present also abstracts from a further, important 
feature  of  the  real-world  climate  situation,  in  that  it  characterizes  the 
problem of climate change as being  only  a threshold issue. Pure threshold 
5 Simon Caney,  'Climate  Change and the  Duties  of  the  Advantaged',  Critical  Review of  
International  Social  and Political  Philosophy, 13  (2010):  203–28,  at  218;  Darrel  Moellendorf, 
Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 2002); Henry Shue, 'Global Environment 
and International Inequality', International Affairs 75 (1999): 531–45.
6 Steve  Vanderheiden,  Atmospheric  Justice (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2008);  Eric 
Neumayer,  'In  Defence  of  Historical  Accountability  for  Greenhouse  Gas  Emissions', 
Ecological Economics, 33 (2000): 185–92; Shue op. cit.
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cases involve futility: if it is certain that a given agent's contribution won't 
make  a  difference  to  the  threshold  being  either  crossed  or  avoided 
(depending on the case), then her contribution is futile - she'd be better off 
expending her energies elsewhere. I've explained in detail elsewhere why I 
don't think climate change is a pure threshold case, here I'll just summarize 
in saying that no matter the large-scale real scientifc thresholds involved, 
there is still  an incremental factor, namely the correlation between higher 
temperatures and more frequent and severe extreme weather events (foods, 
droughts, hurricanes, etc.), which gives countries a reason to act on climate 
change even if  it's clear that insuffciently many other countries will act for 
the thresholds to be avoided.7 Were climate change a pure threshold case in 
the real world, countries might be able to avoid the imperative to reduce 
GHG emissions for much the reasons discussed here. But it's not, so they 
can't.
It  can nonetheless  be  informative  to  abstract  away from certain  of 
these features of the real world situation, and think about a counterpart of  
the climate change situation which lacks culpable agents. In the real world, 
climate change is not (only) a threshold good, and furthermore, there is no 
collective agent with a capacity to meet the most popular proposed targets 
for addressing climate change, for example further warming no greater than 
2º,  or  a  concentration of  greenhouse  gases  no greater  than 450 parts  per 
million (ppm). Thus by the familiar principle that 'ought implies can', there 
can be no such obligation. Of course this is not the end of the story: if the 
best  way to  pursue  the  good of  addressing  climate  change is  to  form a 
collective  agent  which  would  have  the  capacity  to  fulfll  the  relevant 
obligation, then countries ought to take steps toward collectivizing.8 But let's 
imagine that such collectivization has been accomplished, and that there is a 
global collective agent with the capacity to meet one of the proposed targets.
This  agent  will  have  an  obligation,  let's  suppose,  to  reduce  the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to 450ppm (or less). 
That  obligation will  have implications  for  the  members  of  the  collective, 
namely  countries.  Following  on  from arguments  I  have  made  elsewhere 
about the structure of collective obligations,9 countries'  obligations will be 
disjunctive:  either  do your assigned share of the action required to achieve 
the  target,  or  have  the  reasonable  belief  that  insuffciently  many  other 
7 Lawford-Smith, op. cit.
8 Stephanie Collins, 'Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties', Australasian Journal of  
Philosophy, 91, 2 (2013): 231-248.
9 Holly  Lawford-Smith,  'The  Feasibility  of  Collectives'  Action',  Australasian  Journal  of  
Philosophy 90, 3 (2012): 453-467.
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countries will do their assigned share (remember we are assuming in this 
stylized case that addressing climate change is a threshold good without an 
incremental aspect).  In that case, it  is perfectly conceivable that there is a 
failure to address climate change without any country being culpable. That's 
because it is possible to have the reasonable belief that insuffciently many 
other countries will act, and yet be mistaken in that belief. If every country 
has  a  reasonable,  and yet  mistaken,  belief  that  insuffciently  many other 
countries will act, then every country will have satisfed its obligation, by 
satisfying the belief-disjunct rather than the action-disjunct.
If  we  think  the  global  collective  agent's  obligation  was  non-
disjunctive,  then that agent will have failed to do as it ought to have done, 
without any country having failed to do what it, in virtue of the obligation 
upon  the  collective,  ought  to  have  done.  In  that  case  we  still  locate 
culpability somewhere, namely with the collective agent.  It's  just  that the 
culpability doesn't distribute to members.10 I've since become convinced that 
there's no culpability anywhere, because a more sophisticated understanding 
of  the  collective's  obligation  is  that  it  must  distribute  to  members  roles 
jointly suffcient, were they performed, for bringing about the relevant end. 11 
That  is  to  say,  collective  agents  have  done  what  they  ought  to  do  in 
distributing  roles,  so  even  though a  miscommunication  among  members 
may cause it to be the case that the roles are not performed and the end is 
not achieved, there is no culpable failure.  (It  is  also to take a side in the 
debate on whether obligations are to try or to succeed, that it is the former. 12 
Either way, there's a moral ill: the global concentration of greenhouse gases 
will not be reduced to below 450ppm – at least no trajectory leading to that 
outcome will start from this particular point in time. The world has not gone 
as  it  ought,  morally,  to  have gone.  Here  we have no culpability,  and no 
incremental  good  to  retreat  to  in  claiming  that  countries  should  make 
unilateral contributions even without the contributions of the others.
Notice that this same case iterates at the lower level, for the collective 
agents that countries are (possibly: elected offcials, government, or political 
community),  and  their  members  (possibly:  citizens,  residents,  or 
inhabitants).13 Imagine instead that the country decides to act unilaterally 
10 That's what I argued in Lawford-Smith 2012 op. cit. §4.
11 Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith, 'The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to 
States and Back Again', ms.
12 See  discussion  in  §IV,  and  in  John  Gardner,  'The  Wrongdoing  That  Gets  Results', 
Philosophical Perspectives, 18 (2004): 53-88.
13 I give the options in brackets as possible satisfers of the relevant descriptions; but the  
issue of whether countries can be characterized as collective agents, and if not where agency 
lies  within  a  given  country  (if  a  level  higher  than  the  individual),  needs  further 
5
and reduce its  GHG emissions by a  half,  not  via  the formal  channels  of 
legislation but by pushing for social change using a high-visibility media 
campaign. It sets the one-half reduction as a threshold because based on the 
best  available  scientifc  evidence,  this  will  actually  make  a  measurable 
difference to the global temperature. The country makes it clear that each 
member is distributed the role of using an approved online personal GHG 
emissions  calculator  to  fgure  out  their  emissions,  and  then  choose, 
according to their own preferences, ways to cut it in half.
Again, it looks like the obligations distributing from the collective to 
its members will be disjunctive: either cut personal emissions by a half, or  
reasonably  believe  that  insuffciently  many  others  intend  to  cut  their 
emission by a half, such that there's no decent chance of the target being met.  
If every member has a reasonable and yet mistaken belief that insuffciently 
many  other  members  will  act,  then  every  member  has  satisfed  their 
obligation. But then just as in the case of the global collective agent, there's a 
moral ill: the country has done what it ought to do (distribute roles), and 
each member has done what she ought to do (act, or believe), and yet the 
world has gone other than it ought, because it would have been much better 
if the members had have satisfed their obligations via the action disjuncts, 
thereby reduced the country's GHG emissions by one half.
So here we have two cases of the world going other than it ought, 
without  any  culpability  from which  to  derive  remedial  or  compensatory 
obligations.  Is  it  possible,  nonetheless,  to argue that these failures,  of  the 
(stipulated) global collective in the frst case, and of the country-collective in 
the second case, have moral implications for the non-culpable countries, or 
inhabitants of the countries, respectively?
I'm going to argue in what remains of the paper that it is possible, and 
I'm going to try to refne a principle of benefting which elaborates on the 
relevant moral implications. But frst, let me say a little more to alleviate two 
potential  worries.  Firstly,  there  might  be  a  worry  that  culpability  is  still 
lurking somewhere in the background. I think that it probably is, and that's  
because there'll usually be some explanation of why members came to have 
reasonable  and  yet  mistaken  beliefs  about  each  others'  intentions  to  act. 
There will usually be something that someone could have done differently, 
e.g.  signal  her  intentions  and  conditional  commitments  more  clearly,  to 
prevent the possibility of others coming to believe that she will not act. But 
notice that in general,  the plausibility of the cases I've described depends 
only on the plausibility of being able to form reasonable, and yet mistaken, 
investigation. See discussion in Collins & Lawford-Smith op. cit..
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beliefs. Few people would deny this.
Secondly,  there  might  be  a  worry  that  without  culpability,  there's 
simply nothing more to say about obligations or duties, short of the familiar 
line  that  we  can  have  a  duty  to  assist  constrained  by  some  notion  of 
demandingness.14 But this can't be right either. While we might get stronger 
duties  out  of  culpability,15 we  do  think  that  there  can  be  duties  that  are 
stronger than those of mere assistance and yet accrue to agents not culpable 
in the plight of those requiring assistance, for example duties of association, 
and relatedly duties of membership, and although they are precisely what is 
at issue in this paper, duties of  beneting. Merely standing in a relationship 
that I have non-instrumental reason to value with a victim in need of aid,16 
or standing in a relationship in which a victim is vulnerable to me,17 can give 
me reasons  to  provide  aid  to  the  victim.  And many  share  Daniel  Butt's 
intuition that when two potential-assisters share equal holdings, the fact that 
one  person  is  a  benefciary—which  is  to  say  that  their  holdings  are 
counterfactually dependent upon the harm to the victim which caused her to 
be in need of assistance—can tip the balance in favour of that person's being 
duty-bound  to  compensate  the  victim,  rather  than  the  person  whose 
holdings are causally independent of that harm.18
§III. Comparing actual and counterfactual states of affairs
One thing that seems clear is that countries in the stylized version of the 
actual  state  of  affairs  have  beneted  relative to the counterfactual  state  of 
affairs in which the world went as it should have gone.19 If the world had 
gone as it  should have, countries would not have been mistaken in their 
beliefs  about  other  countries'  willingness to  act,  and so they each would 
have fulflled their disjunctive obligation by acting rather than by believing. 
They  would  have  used  portions  of  their  holdings  to  make  signifcant 
14 Peter Singer, 'Famine, Affuence, and Morality', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1972): 229-
243; Jan Narveson, 'We Don't Owe Them A Thing! A Tough-Minded but Soft-Hearted View 
of Aid to the Faraway Needy', The Monist, 86 (2003): 419-433 at 429-30.
15 Holly  Lawford-Smith,  'The  Motivation  Question:  Arguments  from  Justice,  and  from 
Humanity', British Journal of Political Science, 42 (2012b): 661-678.
16 Samuel  Scheffer,  'Relationships  and  Responsibilities',  Philosophy  &  Public  Affairs,  26 
(1997): 189-209.
17 Robert Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), Ch. 
4.
18 Daniel Butt, 'On Benefting from Injustice',  Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 37 (2007): 129-
152.
19 We can only talk about 'beneft' in the context of the short- to medium- term, however,  
because if the worst of the projected effects of climate change actually come to pass, most 
countries will be affected in a way that leaves them with a net loss, although some lucky 
countries may be largely unaffected such that they are still left with a net gain, even if only  
marginally so.
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investments into e.g. public transport infrastructure; switching over to clean 
energy sources; reducing animal agriculture; research and development into 
clean  energy  technologies,  and  technologies  for  both  adapting  to  and 
mitigating  the  effects  of  climate  change.  And  in  that  way,  the  target 
reduction in the concentration of greenhouse gases would, eventually, have 
been met. In the stylized case, countries instead retain their holdings. This is 
the  sense  in  which  countries  beneft  (see  discussion  in  §IV  for 
generalizations of the case).
Countries have not 'benefted from injustice' in Daniel Butt's sense of 
being a third-party who does well out of an injustice visited upon a victim 
by a perpetrator.20 There is no injustice without at least one culpable agent, 
which is why I have characterized the world going other than it ought as a 
'moral  ill'  but  not  an  'injustice'.21 In  order  to  reach  a  conclusion  about 
countries not being entitled to those benefts, we need a principle which tells 
us that benefting is impermissible, such as:
(1) It is impermissible to retain the benets of the world going other than it 
morally ought to have gone.
It  is  immediately  apparent  that  this  principle  needs  refnement. 
Obviously, the world goes other than it morally ought when terrorists bomb 
a heavily-populated city. And equally obviously, two people who fall in love 
while  struggling  through the  aftermath  of  the  bombing beneft  from the 
bombing, at least in the sense that had it not happened, they would not have 
found one another.22 But it would be absurd to say that while they might not 
be able to help having so benefted, it would be impermissible for them to 
retain that beneft, i.e. to remain together. One way to get around this is to 
specify 'net beneft', so that a person may retain any benefts that do not yet  
outweigh the costs, to them, of the world going other than it ought. In the 
case of the couple, it is plausible that they lost more in the attack than they 
gained from fnding one another. But this fx will not work in all cases. For 
example, imagine that the lead in a theatrical performance is mugged shortly 
before the evening's show, and as a result the understudy is assigned her 
role. The world has gone other than it ought; the lead ought not to have been 
mugged. And the understudy has clearly benefted – fnally she gets to fll 
20 Butt op. cit.
21 It  is  more  a  case  of  'wrongless  benefting',  as  discussed  in  Norbert  Anwander, 
'Contributing and Benefting: Two Grounds for Duties to the Victims of Injustice', Ethics and 
International Affairs, 19 (2005): 39-45, although my proposal differs from his in that I don't 
think benefting creates only positive duties.
22 I owe this example to Garrett Cullity, who presented it to Christian Barry.
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the lead role. The mugging itself has no ill effect on the understudy, who is 
only a bare acquaintance of the lead's. So the net benefts far outweigh the 
net costs,  to the understudy, of the world going other than it ought.  But, 
again, it would be absurd to say that the understudy ought not to retain the 
benefts. Surely she ought to play lead, which after all is what the role of 
understudy is designed for, just as two people lucky enough to fnd love 
after a tragedy ought to stay together for as long as they are happy to.
One possible refnement is in terms of the relationship between the 
beneft and the moral ill involved in the world going other than it ought. In  
the stylized version of the climate change case, countries retained holdings 
(primarily  money  and  material  resources)  and  sustained  behaviours 
(continuing animal agriculture at roughly the same levels, continuing to rely 
on fossil fuels, and so on) which were necessary to the world going the way it 
should have. Particular resources are used in one way in the stylized version 
of the actual world, and in another way in the counterfactual world in which 
things  went  as  they  ought  to  have.  This  is  what  makes  the  difference 
between the cases. Two persons falling in love, and an understudy getting to 
perform in the lead's  role,  are both causally downstream from the world 
going other than it ought to have gone, but in neither case is it true that they 
need not to have happened for the world to have gone as it ought to have 
gone. The lead might simply have come down with the fu, and the couple 
might  have  met  anyway.  That  is  not  true  in  the  stylized  version  of  the 
climate change case. It is not possible that the world went as it ought to have 
gone, and countries failed to make the relevant investments and behavioural 
changes. So we can refne the principle as:
(2) It is impermissible to retain any benets necessary to the world going as 
it morally ought to have gone.
Here  we  defne  as  a  'beneft'  any  material  goods (e.g.  money,  resources) 
which, at the salient point in time, would have to have been invested (used, 
spent) for the world to go as it ought. At that time they are simply holdings;  
later when they are retained, they become benefts. This formulation of the 
principle is still  problematic,  because there are a great many junctures at 
which the world has gone other than it morally ought to have gone. Had we 
divided the  world's  resources  (territory,  water,  minerals...)  equally  at  the 
very start of human civilization, and had all transfers since then been just, 
we  would not  have a  morally  ideal  counterfactual  to  make  reference  to, 
because  the  actual  world  would  instantiate  the  conditions  in  the 
counterfactual.  But  in  the  actual  world,  the  acquisition  of  resources  was 
9
initially arbitrary and later a result of conquest, and our history of transfers 
is plagued by oppression, domination, theft and exploitation, not to mention 
a fair bit of luck. There are any number of junctures, branching off from the  
history of the actual world, at which the world morally ought to have gone 
otherwise,  but  in  fact  did not.  One problem we face is  in  specifying the 
content of these counterfactuals – the further back in history the branching-
off, the more diffcult it gets.23
Another problem we have is in the nature of the later branches as 
causally downstream from earlier failures of the world to go as it morally 
ought  to have.  If  the world had gone as it  ought to have gone from the 
beginning  of  civilization,  then  perhaps  we  wouldn't  be  here  wondering 
about  how  to  pursue  the  good  of  a  global  reduction  in  greenhouse  gas 
emissions. I think we can make sense of the idea of the world not going as it 
ought to have at a specifc juncture without having to be able to fll in all the 
details of the ideal counterfactuals for all junctures that someone might be 
interested in. In the stylized climate case, the global collective  failed to bring 
about the target reduction of GHG emissions, without any member country, 
nor  the  global  collective  itself,  being  culpable.  Because  of  that  failure, 
countries  retained the holdings that were necessary to making the world go as it  
ought to have gone. We can compare the holdings that countries have in two 
worlds:  having satisfed their  obligations via the belief disjunct,  countries 
have holdings well above those they would have at the counterpart time in 
the relevant counterfactual world in which they satisfed their obligations 
via  the action  disjunct.  Because it  is  impermissible  to retain any benefts 
necessary to the world going as it morally ought to have gone, it will be 
impermissible for the countries in the stylized version of the actual world to 
retain  those  benefts.  The  thought  is  supposed  to  be  that  we  can  say 
something meaningful about particular junctures in time, even if we can't fll 
in all the details of all possible junctures.
Finally, we should read the benefting principle as having an implicit 
ceteris  paribus clause.  I  do  not  wish  to  suggest  that  benefting  is 
impermissible  across  every  conceivable  circumstance.  We  should  be 
pluralists about the things that matter morally – some things might matter 
much more than the relinquishing of benefts that are not rightfully held. But 
23 One possibility here is to simply ask whether applying the benefting principle will offer 
an opportunity to fx the target problem. In the case of colonial injustice, it's not clear that it  
will, because it's not clear which holdings at which times would have had to be invested  
(used, spent) for the world to have gone as it ought to have. But in the climate change case,  
and in other cases in which we have a clear idea of the precise point in time we're interested 
in,  and holdings which should have been used in one way and were not,  the principle 
should be able to do some heavy lifting.
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in the case that all else is equal, it is impermissible to beneft in the way 
specifed in the benefting principle.
§IV. Relinquishing benets, no matter what?
If  the  beneft  held  by  a  benefciary  is  materially  identical  to  the  harm 
sustained by the  relevant  victim,  it  is  clear  that  the benefciary  ought  to 
relinquish  the  beneft.  For  example,  if  the  Australian  government 
successfully sends thieves into Germany to steal the machines they are using 
to  produce  solar  panels,  the  Australian  government  will  fnd  itself  in 
possession of solar panel production machines whose absence is constitutive 
of the harm to the Germans. The Australians are able to repair the harm, by 
giving  those  machines  back  (although  they  could  also  replace  them,  or 
compensate for them). We like to repair material harms to victims in this 
way for a number of different reasons, primarily because that is what our 
frmly-entrenched system of  property  rights  requires,  but  also  because  it 
deters both thieves and potential recipients of stolen goods if we as a rule 
privilege the frst  person done a material  injustice  in any given chain of 
transfer, which is worthwhile on consequentialist grounds.24
In the stylized version of the climate change case – and in fact in the 
real-world  – the most immediate victims of  climate change will  be those 
living in the world's lowest-lying countries (who will be without territory 
when Arctic  ice melts,  causing the sea level to rise),  those relying on the 
fsheries for subsistence (who will be without the means of subsistence when 
the fsheries collapse), those whose lands will cease to be arable and whose 
access to fresh water will drastically diminish (because of changes to rainfall 
and temperature), and those who fall victim to the extreme weather events 
which are increasing in severity as the global concentration of greenhouse 
gases increases. Who are the benefciaries? Colloquially we might suppose 
that the benefciaries are those who do better under climate change than they 
would  have  without  it,  for  example  those  currently  living  in  frozen 
territories which thaw and become temperate and arable. Or perhaps those 
individuals  who  proft  from  the  negative  effects  upon  others,  e.g.  those 
whose territories have reliable access to fresh water, and who can export it to 
other countries at a high price.
But notice that these benefciaries do not meet the conditions specifed 
24 Of course, there is a lot to criticize in our system of property-rights. Strictly speaking, 
drug companies have the patent over their discoveries, but many people think it would not 
be wrong for poor countries to break those patents. That is because some things are more 
important than property rights,  like preventing terrible suffering. This is  a  controversial  
matter which I don't have time to get into here, but see Sigrid Sterckx, 'Can Drug Patents Be 
Morally Justifed?' Science and Engineering Ethics, 11 (2005): 81-92.
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in the benefting principle: the benefts they have were not necessary to the 
world going as it ought to have. It might be that all countries successfully 
signed a new treaty and then made the investments necessary to fulflling 
their  assigned  share  of  the  global  emissions-reduction  target,  and  yet 
because of the lag between GHGs emitted and effects upon the environment 
felt, countries would still have experienced those 'benefts'. The benefciaries 
need  to  be  identifed  through  the  conditions  specifed  in  the  benefting 
principle, not colloquially. Which agents, in the stylized case, have holdings 
that were necessary to the world going as it should have gone? That question 
is easy enough to answer: practically all countries are benefciaries in that 
sense, because they still have the money and resources that they would have 
invested in doing their  share of addressing climate change.  In fact,  if  we 
ignore the incremental aspect,  that  question can also be answered for the 
real-world climate situation: all countries are benefciaries, except and to the 
extent that they have invested signifcantly and unilaterally in reducing their 
GHG emissions (without a binding agreement with other countries). In the 
real-world,  several actual countries have acted unilaterally in introducing 
some changes, but arguably no country has invested the extensive resources 
that  they  would  have  been  required  to  invest  had  the  agreement  at 
Copenhagen actually succeeded.25
Because there  are  victims who either  need or  will  need reparation 
(resettling through immigration, aid in the form of food, water and shelter, 
and  so  on),  it's  fairly  straightforward  to  say  that  it  is  impermissible  for 
benefciaries to retain the relevant benefts. They would retain them  at the 
expense of  the victims being aided.26 But what if  there is no victim, or the 
victim is long-since dead, and the harms are long-since irreparable? Is it still 
impermissible to retain benefts, or does it not matter in that case? The fact 
that we can ask this question shows that there are two different rationales for 
the benefting principle. The frst is victim-driven. Victims need to be made 
reparation, or compensated,  and that can be done using the relinquished 
benefts.  This  can  be  direct,  as  with  the  stolen  solar  panels  when  the 
Australians can literally give up the panels so that they can be given back, 
and it can be indirect, as in the case of climate refugees who are owed a new 
home, where the relinquished benefts can be used to fund new settlements 
in alternative territories. This victim-driven rationale is the one I have been 
interested in here.
25 This  is  certainly true for  the  set of  all  countries  minus  the least  developed countries 
(LDCs);  it's  controversial  whether  there's  any  fair  arrangement  under  which  the  latter 
would be assigned some share of the GHG emissions-reduction burden.
26 Anwander op. cit. 42-43.
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But there is another rationale for the benefting principle,  which is 
benefciary-driven. On this rationale, it is  impermissible to benet  simpliciter. 
That means there is a moral requirement to relinquish benefts whether or 
not there is a victim to be aided. If there were absolutely nothing related to 
the original moral ills that could be repaired, it would still be better to throw 
the benefts into the .......compost, or recycling....... than to retain them. But 
committing to this rationale is a further step that I am not prepared to take 
here. Thus we can limit the benefting principle:
(3) If there is at least one person who suffers as a result of the world going 
other than it morally ought to have gone who can be compensated or made 
reparation,  then to  that  extent  it  is  impermissible  to  retain any benets  
necessary to the world going as it morally ought to have gone.
Bearing in mind that this is a ceteris paribus principle, it seems to get things 
roughly right.
§V. Generalizations & advantages of the beneting principle
The formulation in (3) picks out victims in virtue of their suffering as a result 
of  'the  world  going  other  than  it  morally  ought  to  have  gone',  and 
benefciaries in virtue of their holding 'benefts necessary to the world going 
as it morally ought to have gone'.  It's natural then to ask exactly what it  
takes for the world to go as it (or other than it) ought. In the stylized climate 
case  I  presented  above,  the  work  is  being  done  by  the  fact  that  agents' 
obligations are disjunctive. Even though the obligation is satisfed regardless 
of which disjunct is satisfed, it is clear that it would have been much better 
for agents to have satisfed their obligations via the action disjunct rather 
than the belief disjunct, and furthermore that they easily could have, were it 
not  for  unfortunate  miscommunications  (remember,  the  belief  that  others 
won't  act  has to be a reasonable one).  The question is  whether there are 
generalizations  of  that  case,  or  collective  action  cases  are  unique  in  the 
respect  of  generating  the  kind  of  non-culpable  failure,  and  concomitant 
beneft, discussed above.
I think there are two kinds of generalizations, although I am less sure 
about  the  second.  The frst  is  to  cases  where  individuals'  obligations  are 
disjunctive, but where there is no issue of acting collectively. The second is to 
cases where individuals' obligations are categorical, and yet where there can 
be  non-culpable  failure.  On  the  frst,  take  any  case  where  objective  and 
subjective  oughts  come  apart,  and  add  in  two  further  features,  namely 
material  benefts,  and at least one victim. For example, Chris  is a factory 
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owner. Imagine that he is obliged to either have the reasonable belief that a 
certain safety device would not be necessary, or to have the safety device 
installed.  And  imagine  that  he  satisfes  this  obligation  by  having  the 
reasonable  belief  that  the  safety  device  would  not  be  necessary,  but 
unfortunately his belief―although reasonable―was formed on the basis of 
misprinted  information  about  the  industry-wide  accident  rates.  The 
objective  and  the  subjective  oughts  come  apart  here  because  objectively, 
Chris ought to have installed the safety device, on the basis of the correct 
evidence about incident rates. But subjectively, it was not the case that he 
ought  to  have done,  because relative  to his  reasonable beliefs,  the safety 
device  was  unnecessary.  Now  imagine  that  one  of  the  factory  workers 
suffers an occupational injury and is badly hurt.
There is a clear sense in which it would have been better for Chris to 
have satisfed his disjunctive obligation via the action disjunct (install the 
safety device) than the belief disjunct (reasonably believe that the device is 
not necessary), and we see that but for the misprinted information he would 
have done. Most people think that culpability attaches to the subjective and 
not the objective ought (so long as the agent is not culpably ignorant, which 
Chris is not), so Chris is non-culpable in the accident's having occurred. But 
had the world gone as it ought, the safety device would have been installed, 
and the accident would not have happened. The factory worker remains in 
hospital for some time. So there is at least one victim of the world going 
other than it ought, namely the worker, and there is at least one benefciary 
of  the  world  going  other  than  it  ought,  namely  Chris.  The  benefciary 
principle specifes that Chris ought to give up those holdings he has over 
and above  what  he would have had  if  the  world  had gone as  it  ought, 
namely, the cost of having had the safety device installed. So we might think 
that he has to give the cost of the device to the worker, as a contribution to  
his medical expenses.27
On the second generalization, we can use any obligation whatsoever, 
so long as we accept that individuals' obligations are to  try  rather than to 
succeed.28 Obligations to try are categorical, so this gives us cases that rely 
neither on collective action situations nor on obligations being disjunctive. 
27 Some might think he should do even more than this; it often shows up in discussion of  
'dirty hands' cases that even without culpability, a good person ought to signal lament of  
their being somehow related to harm. After all, the accident took place in Chris's factory. I  
have never shared this intuition; I think probably people read refusal to pretend culpability 
as an indicator of  genuine culpability (e.g.  that the person related to the harm was not 
suffciently careful in avoiding it). It is a further question whether Chris should also install 
the safety device in order to prevent future accidents―it seems that on the basis of the new 
information he has about accident occurrence, he probably should.
28 Gardner op. cit.
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As above, we need the same two further features of a victim and a material 
benefciary. For example, imagine now that David is the factory owner, and 
his obligation to (try to) install the safety devices is instead categorical, given 
the well-publicized information on industry accidents. However, despite his 
very best efforts, the world does not cooperate in the small ways necessary 
to facilitate his installing the device. The bank's servers are down so despite 
entering  his  credit  card  details  online  his  payment is  rejected,  and he  is  
notifed  of  this  in  an  email  which  he  doesn't  read  until  the  end  of  the 
business day. The next morning, just like in the last case, one of the factory 
workers suffers an occupational injury and is badly hurt. In such a case, it 
looks  like  David  has  satisfed  his  categorical  obligation,  because  his 
obligation was only to  try,  and he did the best  he could.  Nonetheless,  it 
would have been better if he'd tried and succeeded; and there's a nearby way 
the world could have gone such that he did in fact succeed (the credit card 
payment  went  through,  the  device was delivered in  the  morning and in 
place before the accident occurred). Thus we have another kind of case in 
which the world goes other than it ought, morally, to have gone, and yet for 
which there is no culpability. There is clearly a victim, namely the factory 
worker,  and  there  is  clearly  a  benefciary,  namely  David.  The  benefting 
principle specifes that David ought to give up those holdings he has over 
and above  what  he would have had  if  the  world  had gone as  it  ought, 
namely,  (again)  the  cost  of  the  safety  device  to  the  victim  as  a  partial 
contribution to his medical expenses.
The benefting principle is useful for all such generalizations, because 
it  provides  a  kind  of  backup  moral  undermining  of  the  affuents' 
entitlements to their holdings. Our usual go-to is culpability, but failing that 
we still have a way of saying that certain persons should give up certain of 
their  holdings  in  favour  of  helping  salient  victims  or  persons  in  need. 
Whether  this  is  an  argument  from justice  will  depend on your  preferred 
understanding of justice, but whatever kind of argument it is, it does not rely 
on culpability, as justice-based arguments so often do.
Finally,  it  is  an  advantage  of  my  formulations  of  the  benefting 
principle  that  they  seem  to  partly  avoid  the  non-identity  problem  frst 
presented by Derek Parft.29 In brief, the problem is that claims that a given 
person benefts, or is harmed, are made relative to a given counterfactual 
baseline, and very often this counterfactual baseline will be one in which the 
given person would not have existed. The formulations in §III and §IV avoid 
this problem because the counterfactual baseline is a matter of the holdings 
29 Derek Parft, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), p. 363.
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and not the persons. If the world had gone as it ought, the holdings would be 
one way; given that it goes other than it ought, the holdings go another way. 
We fgure out who counts as a benefciary by fguring out what the pattern 
of holdings should look like, and then we apply the benefting principle to 
give  those  benefciaries  a  reason to  relinquish  the  relevant  holdings  and 
direct them toward the relevant victims. I say the formulations only partly 
avoid the problem because there's  still  a  question of  how to identify the 
victims.  It might be possible to avoid it altogether with an objective story 
about suffering, such as falling below the level of subsistence, or failing to 
have  one's  basic  human  rights  met,  in  which  the  suffering  is  causally 
downstream of the relevant branching of the worlds. But I'm not sure about 
that.
Notice that in the initial  stylized climate case,  the benefciaries are 
countries,  so  there  will  be  a  further  question  about  how  the  obligation 
bearing upon a country to relinquish benefts will distribute out to members 
(indeed,  there  is  a  question  of  how  to  characterize  membership  in 
countries).30 But in the two generalizations discussed earlier in this section, 
the benefciaries are individuals, so the obligations bear directly.
§VI. Conclusion
Countries, and the individuals who make them up, have many reasons to do 
something  about  climate  change.  Developed  countries  are  causally 
implicated  in  having  brought  it  about  (whether  or  not  some  or  all 
developing countries are also causally implicated). Many or most countries 
stand in associative relationships with countries who will fall victim to the 
projected  effects  of  climate  change  (e.g.  mother  countries  and  their  ex-
colonies, countries contracting or agreeing to mutually benefcial trade and 
immigration arrangements).31 Most countries have at least some capacity to 
assist  the  actual  or  projected victims of  the actual  or  projected effects  of 
climate change, such as the climate refugees whose lands will be subsumed 
by  sea-level  rise,  or  those  who  lose  their  homes  and  livelihoods  during 
extreme  weather  events.  Countries  also  have  some  capacity  to  assist 
indirectly,  for  example  by  preventing  the  effects  of  further  warming,  by 
severely  reducing  their  GHG  emissions,  by  switching  to  clean  energy 
technologies, and so on. Finally, every country has a self-interested reason to 
act,  at  least  if  we  use  an  inclusive  notion  of  'self'  which  persists  over 
30 See Lawford-Smith 2012 op. cit. for the schematic answer, and Collins & Lawford-Smith 
op. cit. for an application to countries.
31 Lea Ypi, Robert Goodin, & Christian Barry, 'Associative Duties, Global Justice, and The 
Colonies', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37 (2009): 103-135.
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generations,  because  those  countries  will  themselves  experience  the 
projected harms of climate change, to a greater or lesser degree. And they 
have a reason to act sooner, rather than later, because we know it to be true 
that the later we act,  the worse things will be,  both environmentally and 
economically.32 The  discussion here  has been  intended only  to  throw yet 
another reason for acting on the pile – a country has a reason to relinquish 
any  benefts  it  has  from  the  various  failures  involved  in  the  history  of 
negotiating  climate  change  action,  so  that  those  benefts  can  be  used  in 
aiding current and future victims of climate change, and preventing even 
further harm to persons and the environment from occurring. That is true 
even if that country is not culpable in those failures, even if no countries are 
culpable in those failures. It is impermissible to retain resources necessary to 
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